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Democracy and Stock Market Performance in African Countries 
Abstract
Purpose –  This  paper  assesses  the  incidence  of  political  institutions  on  stock  market 
performance dynamics in Africa.
Design/methodology/approach – The estimation technique used is a Two-Stage-Least Squares 
Instrumental  Variable  methodology.  Channels  of  democracy,  polity  and  autocracy  are 
instrumented with legal-origins, religious-legacies, income-levels and press-freedom qualities to 
account for stock market  performance dynamics  of capitalization,  value traded, turnover and 
number of listed companies.  To ensure robustness of the analysis,  the following checks are 
carried out: (1) usage of alternative indicators of political institutions; (2) employment of two 
distinct  interchangeable  sets  of  moment  conditions  that  engender  every  category  of  the 
instruments; (3) usage of alternative indicators of stock market performance; (4) account for the 
concern  of  endogeneity;  (5)  usage  of  Principal  Component  Analysis(PCA)  to  reduce  the 
dimensions  of  stock  market  dynamics  and  political  indicators  and  then  check  for  further 
robustness of findings in the regressions from resulting indexes.  
Findings –  Findings broadly demonstrate that democracy improves investigated stock market 
performance dynamics.
Practical implications –  As a policy recommendation, the role of sound political institutions is 
crucial  for financial  development  in Africa.  Democracies have important  effects  on both the 
degree of competition for public office and the quality of public offices that favor stock market 
development in the African continent. 
Originality/value – To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to assess the incidence of 
democracy on stock market  performance in an exclusive African context.  Political  strife has 
plagued many African countries and continue to pose a significant threat to financial  market 
development.
JEL Classification: G10 ; G18; G28; P16;  P43
Keywords:  Financial Markets; Government Policy; Political Economy; Development
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1.  Introduction
The  deepening  of  stock  markets  in  developing  countries  and  threats  to  democratic 
institutions   in  Africa  represent  an  important  challenge  to  the  manner  in  which  political 
institutions are affecting  stock market performance in the continent1. Although  a number of 
studies have investigated the dynamics of stock market performance worldwide, the emphasis 
has often been on developed economies and the emerging markets of Latin America and Asia. In 
line  with  the  literature(Alagidede,2008;  Asongu,  2012a),  such  neglect  is  far  from  amazing 
because  Africa’s  markets  are  perceived  as  excessively  risky  and  highly  illiquid  with  less 
developed operating institutional  environments.  Economic  instability  and political  strife  have 
plagued  many  African  countries  and  continue  to  pose  a  significant  threat  to  foreign 
investments(Kenyan  post  election  crises  in  2007/2008,  Zimbabwe’s  economic  meltdown, 
Nigeria’s marred transition in 2008, the unending Egyptian revolution,  not to mention recent 
coups  d’état  in  Mali  and  Guinea-Bissau).  With  the  exception  of   South  Africa,  no  African 
country has emerged as an economic power with a standard financial market. This might partly 
account for  the lack of academic research on the capital  markets of the continent.  However 
Africa  has  recently  witnessed significant  economic  and financial  developments.  This  overall 
growth has attracted attention from scholars and pundits. Thus how established institutions are 
playing-out in the development of financial markets in the continent could have relevant policy 
implications. 
1 With respect to the IMF (2006) and Mosley (2008) stock market capitalization stood at $37.2 trillion, compared to  
global GDP of $41.3 trillion. Whereas this figure was slightly less than global commercial  bank assets ($ 57.3  
trillion),  it  markedly surpassed the total  size of outstanding public securities,  which stood at  $ 23.1 trillion. A 
substantial bulk of global stock market capitalization broadly represents developed-country equity markets, but less  
developed countries  which  accounted  for  14% of  total  capitalization in  2004 are  quickly gaining  ground.  For  
example  some emerging  markets  like  those  of  Malaysia,  Singapore  and  South  Africa  have  total  stock  market  
capitalization that exceed their respective Gross Domestic Products.
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Though there is a large literature in economics, political science and public policy which 
considers ways in which increased globalization in trade and finance affects national economic 
outcomes  and  government  policy  making(Helleiner,  1994;  Strange,  1996;  Friedman,  1999; 
Obstfeld  &  Taylor,  2004),  with  the  growing  importance  of  financial  markets  owing  to 
globalization,  we  currently  know  very  little  about  how  democracy(another  product  of 
globalization in some respect) affects the quality of financial markets. This work aims to breach 
the gap by exploring  how political  institutions  affect  government  quality  dynamics  of  stock 
market  capitalization,  total  value  traded,  turnover   and  number   of  listed  companies  in  the 
African continent. 
The relevance of this study also draws on the need for alternative sources of investment 
in the continent. With the failure of privatization projects, the African business environment is 
increasingly faced with the need for alternative forms of investment(Rolfe & Woodward,2004), 
financing  sources  for  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises(SMEs)  and  revitalization  of  business 
regulation. Owing to the weight of available business challenges in the African continent, there 
are crucial needs for capital inflows, regulatory reforms and institutional quality. Having sold a 
great chunk of its state assets, the Zambian government like other sub-Saharan African countries 
are  looking  for  alternative  channels  of  investment(Rolfe  &  Woodward,2004).  It  has  been 
established in African business literature that foreign capital inflow location-decision is strongly 
influenced  by  political  economy  considerations(Bartels  et  al.,2009),  political  &  regulatory 
uncertainty(Toumi,2011) and the peril of corruption(Darley, 2012). 
Apart  from the need for investment  in the continent,  financial  market  performance is 
imperative  for  a  multitude  of  reasons.  Financial  theory  regards  integrated  and  performing 
markets to be relatively more efficient compared to divergent ones. A  well performing stock 
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market stimulates cross-border flow of funds, improves trading volume which in-turn increases 
stock market liquidity and grants investors the opportunity to efficiently allocate capital(Chen et 
al.,2002;  Asongu,  2012bcd).  These  result  in  a  lower  cost  of  capital  for  firms  and  lower 
transaction cost for investors(Kim et al.,2005). Moreover,  a performing financial market has the 
positive  rewards  to  financial  stability  as  it  minimizes  the  probability  of  asymmetric 
shocks(Umutlu  et  al.,2010).  Financial  stability  in-turn  may  reduce  the  risk  of  cross-border 
financial contagion(Beine et al.,2010) and augment the capacity of African economies to absorb 
shocks(Yu et al., 2010).  It is also interesting to note that stock markets may also be performing 
to reflect the level of arbitrage activity.  When markets are developed and well performing, it 
denotes there is a common force such as arbitrage activity that attracts the markets together. It 
further indicates that the growth of markets will mean the potential for making above normal 
profits and  international diversification will be limited as super-normal profits are arbitraged 
away(Von Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989).  In the same line of reasoning, if  barriers or potential 
barriers generating country risks and exchange rate premiums are absent,  the consequence is 
similar  yields  for  financial  assets  of  similar  risk  and  liquidity  regardless  of  nationality  and 
locality(Von Furstenberg  & Jeon,  1989).  Therefore,  the imperative  for African stock market 
development  draws  on the  tenets  of  arbitrage  and the  hypothesis  proffered  by  the  portfolio 
theory.  This  implies,  the motivations  for  growth in  financial  markets  has foundations  in the 
literature of stock market interdependence and  portfolio diversification(Grubel.,1968; Levy & 
Sarnat, 1970). 
In  fact  sound  political  institutions  are  crucial  for  African  stock  market  development 
because the Russian experience has shown that foreign investors are willing to provide funds and 
much  needed  managing  expertise  to  newly  privatized  firms  only  if  the  legal  and  political 
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infrastructure is  adequate  at  curbing corruption among government  officials  and limiting  the 
risks  of  expropriation(Lambardo,2000;  Lombardo  & Pagano,2002).  A  proportion  of  African 
countries especially those of French speaking sub-Sahara have stock markets that are taking too 
long to gain grounds. Hence the findings of this study could really result in relevant institutional  
policy recommendations.  The rest  of  the paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2 examines 
existing literature. Data and methodology are presented and outlined respectively in Section 3. 
Section 4 covers empirical analysis and corresponding discussion. We conclude with Section 5. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical framework
2.1.1 Legal origins and financial development 
This  section  describes  the  law and finance  theory.  We devote  space  to  spell-out  the 
difference in how legal heritage continue to shape private property rights protection,  investor 
protection  laws  and  financial  development  today.  In  this  section,  we  also  describe  two 
mechanisms via which legal-origin may influence the contracting environment: the political and 
adaptability mechanisms.  
a) Law, enforcement and financial development 
The first strand of the law and finance theory emphasizes  that legal institutions influence 
corporate finance and financial development(La Porta et al.,1998). The law and finance theory 
stresses that cross-country differences in (i) contract, company, bankruptcy and security laws, 
(iii) the legal system’ emphasis on private property rights, and (iii) the efficiency of enforcement 
influence  the degree of expropriation  and hence  the confidence with which people purchase 
securities and take part in financial markets. As sustained by La Porta et al.(2000a) and backed 
by Beck & Levine(2005)  the law and finance  view follows naturally  from the  evolution  of 
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corporate finance theory during the past half century. A country’s contract, company, security 
and bankruptcy laws, as well  as the enforcement  of these laws fundamentally  determine  the 
rights of securities holders and the operation of financial systems.  Debt and equity are viewed 
by Modigliani & Miller(1958) as legal claims on the cash flow of firms; statutory law and the 
degree to which courts enforce those laws shape the types of contracts that are used to address 
agency problems(Jensen & Meckling,1976); financial economists have increasingly focused on 
the control that financial securities bring to their owners and the effect of different legal rules on 
corporate control(Hart, 1995).
As  to  how  legal  establishments  should  influence  corporate  finance  and  financial 
development, within a broad vision there are differing opinions regarding the degree to which 
legal systems should support the private contractual arrangements and the degree to which the 
legal system should have specific laws concerning shareholder and creditor rights. According to 
Coasians(Coase, 1960), the legal system should simply enforce private contracts. Thus effective 
legal  establishments  allow  knowledgeable  and  experienced  financial  market  participants  to 
design a vast  array of sophisticated private  contracts  in a bid to ameliorate  complex agency 
problems(Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1964; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991).  The law and finance theory 
three-point view has been highlighted in the introduction of this strand. Whether assuming a 
Coasian dependence on enforcing complex private contracts or an approach that augments the 
support  of  private  contracts  with  company,  bankruptcy,  securities  law…etc,  the  law  and 
finance’s  first  part  argues  that  the  degree  of  protection  of  private  investors  is  a  paramount 
determinant of financial development. 
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b)  From legal-origin to finance: political and adaptability mechanisms
In the second strand we elucidate theories by Beck et al.(2003) which assess ‘why’ legal  
origin matter in financial development.  They examine two channels  by which legal origins may 
influence financial development: the political and adaptability channels. 
The political mechanism is founded on two standpoints. Firstly, legal traditions differ in 
the emphasis they attribute to protecting the rights of private investors relative to those of the  
state.  Secondly,  private  property  rights  protection  forms  the  foundation  for  financial 
development.  Hence  historical  based  differences  in  legal  origin  can  help  explain  existing 
disparities  in financial development with respect to this component of law and finance(La Porta 
et al.,1998).  A great many scholars argue that the Civil law has tended to support the rights of 
the State, vis-à-vis private property rights, that is quite the opposite in Common law. Therefore 
Civil  law  countries  have  provided  for  legal  systems  that  have  unhealthy  implications  for 
financial development. A powerful State with a responsive civil law at its disposal will tend to 
divert  the  flows  of  society’s  resources  towards  favored  ends,  which  is  not  conducive   to 
competitive  financial  markets.  More  so  a  powerful   State  will  have  difficulty  credibly 
committing to not interfere in financial markets, that will also obstruct financial development.  
Thus, the law and finance theory emphasizes that Civil law countries will have feebler property 
rights  protection  and  lower  levels  of  financial  development  than  countries  with  other  legal 
traditions. In contrast, Common law has historically tended to side with private property owners 
against the State according to this view. Instead of becoming a tool of the state, Common law has 
acted as a powerful tool in the brandishing of private property rights. Rajan & Zingales(2003) 
note that governments in Civil law countries were more effective than governments in Common 
law countries in stretching the role of government at the cost of financial market growth during 
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the Interwar period 1919-1939. They attribute this to the heavy task of the judiciary vis-à-vis the 
legislature. Thus, the law and finance theory postulates that the British Common law supports 
financial development to a greater extent than Civil law systems. 
The second mechanism linking legal origin to financial development is the adaptability 
channel, that is also built on two premises. Firstly, legal systems differ in their ability to adjust  
to  changing and evolving circumstances.  Secondly,  if   a country’s  legal  system adapts  only 
slowly  to  changing  circumstance(especially  economic),  large  gaps  will  open  between  the 
financial needs of an economy and the ability of the legal system to support and fulfill those 
needs. An influential, albeit by no means unanimous position of inquiry holds that legal systems 
that embrace case and judicial discretion tend to adhere more efficiently to changing conditions 
than legal  systems that  adapt  rigidly to formalistic  procedures and that rely more strictly on 
judgments narrowly based on statutory law(Coase, 1960). Posner(1973) disputes that although, 
legislators  consider  the  impact  on  particular  individuals  and  interest  groups  when  writing 
statutes, judges are forbidden from considering the deservedness of specific  litigants and thus 
more likely to render decisions premised on objective efficiency criteria(Rubin,1982, 205). It 
follows that Common law systems are much more efficient than statutory-based systems because 
inefficient  laws are routinely litigated and re-litigated pushing the law toward more efficient 
outcomes(Rubin, 1977; Priest, 1977). In another line of march, some authors argue that statutory 
law evolves  slowly  and is  subject  to  a  greater  degree  of  inefficient  political  pressures  than 
Common law(Posner, 1973; Bailey & Rubin,1994). 
2.1.2  Wealth-effects in financial development
This  section  aims  to  justify  our  choice  of  income-level  instrumental  variables  in  the 
empirical phase of the paper. In accordance with Beck et al.(1999) and Asongu(2011a) financial 
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development  varies  with  wealth.   Therefore   theoretical  and  empirical  literature  show 
considerable differences across countries with respect to wealth2. This  theory could be explained 
from three main strands: financial intermediary development; private credit & life insurance and 
stock market development. 
The first strand on financial intermediary development engenders: central bank assets to 
total  financial  assets,  deposit  money  bank  assets  to  total  financial  assets,  other  financial 
institutions assets to total financial assets and deposit money versus central bank assets(Beck et 
al,1999,p.13). With respect to this strand, central banks loose relative importance as one moves 
from low to high-income countries, whereas other financial institutions gain relative importance. 
Deposit  money  banks  gain  importance  versus  Central  banks  with  a  higher  income  level. 
Financial  depth  increases  with  income  levels.  Deposit  money  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions are bigger and more active in rich countries,  while central  banks are smaller.  As 
presented  by Beck et al.(1999), from  the 1960s to 1980s central bank assets increased and then 
decreased again in the 1990s. They emphasized that the ‘deposit money banks versus central 
bank assets’ rise and drop was mainly driven by low-income countries.
The second strand focuses on private domestic credit and life insurance across income 
groups(Beck et al.,1999, p.21). ‘Private credit by other financial institutions’ embodies bank-like 
institutions, insurance companies, private pension and provident funds, pool investment schemes 
and development banks; whereas  insurance development consists of life insurance companies, 
life insurance penetration and life insurance density.  With regard to this strand, private credit by 
2 “To assess the size and activity of financial intermediaries across countries, we use the World Bank classification
of countries according to their income levels (World Development Indicators 1998). We can distinguish between  
four country groups; high income countries with a GNP per capita in 1997 higher than $9,656, upper middle  
income countries with a GNP per capita between $3,126 and $9,655,lower middle income countries with a GNP per  
capita between $786 and $3,125 and low income countries with a GNP per capita of less than $786”(Beck et 
al.,1999, p.13).
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all five categories of ‘other financial institutions’ augment as we move from low to high-income 
countries.  Private credit by life insurance companies, the life insurance penetration and the life 
insurance density increases with GDP per capita. Interestingly, for the first two indicators, the 
lower-middle income group exhibits  the lowest medians.  It is also worth noting high-income 
countries demonstrate  a life insurance penetration ten times as high as lower-middle income 
countries  and  a  life  insurance  density  nearly  one  hundred  times  higher  than  low-income 
countries. 
In the third strand, we have stock market development across income groups, which is 
interesting for our paper as it vindicates the choice of income-level instrumental variables in the 
empirical  section.  Stock market  development  is  in  6 categories:  stock  market  capitalization, 
stock market total value traded, stock market turnover, private bond market capitalization, equity 
issues and long-term private debt. This strand suggests that there is a significant variation in size, 
activity and efficiency of stock markets across income groups. Countries with higher levels of 
GDP  per  capita  have  bigger,  more  active  and  more  efficient  financial  markets(Beck  et 
al.,1999,25). Wealthy countries also have larger bond markets and issue more equity and private 
bonds. Stock markets  have soared in size, activity and efficiency over the last three decades 
largely due to significant changes in higher GDP per capita countries. 
2.1.3  Theoretical background to Islamic financial markets  
This  section  aims  to  lay  the  theoretical  foundation  for  the  empirical  validity  of  the 
religious instruments. Borrowing from Hearn et al.(2011), Islam represents a system of beliefs 
founded on the interpretation of passages from the Qu’ran and various Had’ith and Sunnah that 
are  short  texts  regarding customs of the Muslim community and relating  experiences  of  the 
prophet Mohammed(Pryor, 2007). These form the premise of Shari’ya law, that permeates all 
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areas of the wider Islamic system, including economics, finance, law, politics and government as 
integral parts and that have common values of Islamic social justice(Asutey,2007). The Islamic 
financial system is based and regulated on the same Shari’ya principles as the overall economy 
and society(Iqbal,1997). These govern the nature of contracts and the design of institutions to 
support  the  market  and  regulation  of  participants’  behavior.  Individuals  within  an  Islamic 
financial  system will  be  subject  to  behavioral  norms,  which  give  rise  to  very  heterogenous 
assumptions to those that form the foundation of regulation  in western markets. 
2.1.4  Press-freedom and finance 
In this section, we highlight a case for the choice of press-freedom instrumental variables. 
From a theoretical perspective, press-freedom and the Efficiency Market Hypothesis(EMH) of 
financial  markets move hand-in-glove. Empirically,  freedom of the press is one of the major 
efficient market channels and only with  unrestricted press-freedom can information be rapidly 
spread and fully incorporated into asset prices(Guo-Ping, 2008). 
2. 2 Democracy, stock market performance and growth 
Democracy  has  been  subject  to  much  attention  in  circles  dealing  with  developing 
countries.  Democracy is now used by many national  development  agencies  and international 
organizations  such  as  the  World  Bank,  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  United 
Nations  to  assess  the  state  of  developing  countries.  As  we have  outlined  earlier,  this  paper 
examines how political institutions affect the performance of stock markets in African countries. 
Political institutions describe the  arrangements that regulate financial markets. These institutions 
compose  the  legal,  political  and  supervisory  bodies  which  provide  cohesion  and  order  in 
business activities. The equitable functioning of the legal process, the height of political stability, 
the level  of systematic  corruption,  the degree of voice & accountability,  the rule of law and 
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regulation quality are factors that define the quality of these institutions and their capacity to 
oversee financial markets. Democracy has important implications on the dealings of firms and 
institutions and the cost associated with such interactions. 
The ability of the judiciary to enforce contractual rights of shareholders impinges on the 
possibility  of  managerial  expropriation  and  ultimately  on  the  profitability  of  firms.  On  this 
position of thought,  La Porta  et  al.  (1997, 1998) argue that improving corporate governance 
rules, their enforcements and the quality of accounting standards results in greater reliance on 
stock market financing by companies. More so, judicial factors directly infringe on the amount 
of  corporate  resources  diverted  by  managers  and  enable  shareholders  the  possibility  of 
monitoring  managers  at  lower  cost.  Legal  systems  supportive  of  investor  protection  tend to 
augment the amount of funds that risk-averse investors are willing to channel towards firms. 
Some authors have emphasized the importance of legal environments and corporate standards in 
fund manager investments (Aggarwal et al., 2002).  
A  democratic  environment  can  increase  returns  to  shareholders  by  reducing  both 
transaction and agency costs. The early literature on political institutions is focused on firm-level 
agency cost resulting from the ownership and control delineation structure of firms. The seminal 
work of Jensen & Meckling (1976) provided the conceptual framework for a soaring body of 
studies.  The  pioneering  work  discovered  that  corporate  governance  channels  themselves  are 
subject  to  different  interpretations  and  weak  degrees  of  enforceability  and  that  the  level  of 
investor protection which such channels were designed to promote could deteriorate in the face 
of structurally flawless governance provisions. Thus the strength of such mechanisms were based 
solely on the ability of firms to adhere to them. Hence, enforceability of contractual provisions 
became the first extension in the conception and understanding of the agency conflict between 
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managers and shareholders. In recent literature however, the focus has been shifted from firm-
specific  governance  to  country-level  governance  atmospheres  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1997,  1998; 
Shleifer & Wolfenson, 2002; Asongu, 2011bcdef; Agbor, 2011). Beyond the interaction between 
firms and institutions arising from agency costs, transaction costs have been the neglect in many 
market-centered  views  of  economic  structure.  North  (1994)  has  argued  that  tightly  defined 
property rights and their  cost effective enforcements are important requirements  for low-cost 
transactions which are imperative to productive economies. 
The rewards of judicial  improvements  include not only stock market  enlargement  but 
also greater  integration  with world financial  markets  through the appeal  to influx of capital. 
However increasing integration may turn to decrease the importance of the quality of securities  
regulation. In line with Hooper et al. (2009) increasing market integration significantly lowers 
the cost of capital.  Hail & Leuz (2003) assess to what extent the effect of the legal institutions  
and  securities  regulation  differs  by  market  regulation  and  economic  progress.  Supposing 
investors can invest freely around the world, the quality of securities regulation of any particular 
country  may  become  less  relevant.  From both  theoretical  and  empirical  evidence,  country-
specific  factors  become  less  relevant  in  asset  pricing  as  markets  become  more  integrated 
(Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Stulz, 1999). Nay note should be taken of the fact that, the precedence 
of  this  increasing  integration  are  the  benefits  of  judicial  enforcement  and  environmental 
institutional quality.  Hail & Leuz(2003) have assessed international differences in the cost of 
equity for firms across 40 countries. They analyze if differences in countries’ legal institutions 
(and in particular securities regulation) are systematically linked to international cost of capital 
variations.  Their  results  show that  firms  in  countries  with  strong  legal  institutions  have  on 
average lower cost of capital than those in countries with weak legal systems, after controlling 
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for risk and country factors.  In substance, cost of capital is systematically lower in countries 
with  strong  securities  regulation  which  have  extensive  disclosure  rules  and  strong  legal 
enforcement.  Therefore,  consequences  are  highest  for  institutions  that  mandate  disclosure  to 
investors and are also present for those institutions that facilitate the enforcement of financial 
contracts, either by lowering the burden of proof in securities litigation or by providing effective 
courts. 
Rosenberg & Birdzell (1986) posit the emergence of London as a world financial center 
was made possible by the reputation of fairness that the English courts and common-law had 
acquired by the 20th century. The experience of transitional economies and the central role that 
legal institutions play in the working of markets has been abundantly discussed (La Porta et al.,  
2000b). The Russian experience has demonstrated that foreign investors are willing to provide 
funds and much needed managing expertise  to  newly privatized  firms  only if  the legal  and 
political  infrastructure  is  adequate  in  curbing  corruption  among  government  officials  and 
assuaging the risks of expropriation(Lambardo,2000; Lombardo & Pagano,2002). Lombardo & 
Pagano(2002) join Johnson  & Shleifer(1999) in stressing that, in order to reap the benefits from 
market-oriented reforms, policy makers in transition economies must make sure that a fair level 
playing field is instituted so that investors can concentrate on exploiting growth opportunities 
without fearing the abuse of their property rights. 
Another important parameter democratic institutions enforce is the control of corruption 
which is often the source of insider-dealing and substantial impediments to the smooth growth of 
financial markets. Bhattacharya & Daouk(1999) examine the impact on the cost of equity capital 
of insider trading regulation and find that, whereas the mere existence of law prohibiting insider 
trading is  ineffectual,  their  enforcement  reduces  the risk-adjusted  expected  return  on equity. 
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After controlling for risk factors, a liquidity factor and other legal determinants of the cost of 
equity, the investigation finds that the enforcement of insider trading laws reduces the cost of 
equity by 5%. Himmelberg  et  al.(2004)  hypothesize  that  lack  of  investor  protection  obliges 
company insiders to hold greater fractions of the equity of the companies they manage. These 
high holdings subject insiders to a higher rate of idiosyncratic risk that in turn augment the risk  
premium and hence the marginal cost of capital. They suggest a negative link between the degree 
of investor  protection  and the fraction of equity held by insiders  and a positive  relationship 
between equity ownership and the marginal return to capital. 
2.3  African perspective of governance and stock market performance
2.3.1 Motivations for African stock market performance
In accordance with Asongu(2012a), although a number of papers have investigated the 
dynamic performance of equity markets worldwide, the emphasis has often been on developed 
economies and the emerging markets of Latin America and Asia. According to Alagidede(2008), 
such neglect is far from surprising as Africa’s markets are perceived as excessively risky, highly 
illiquid  with  less  developed  operating  institutional  environments.  Economic  instability  and 
political  strife have plagued many African countries and continue to pose a serious threat to 
foreign investments(Kenyan post election crises in 2007/2008, Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown, 
Nigeria’s marred transition in 2008, the unending Egyptian revolution,  not to mention recent 
coups  d’état  in  Mali  and  Guinea-Bissau).  With  the  exceptions  of  South  Africa,  no  African 
country has emerged as an economic power. This might partly explain the lack of academic 
research on the  financial  markets  of  the continent.  Africa  has  recently  witnessed significant 
economic  and  financial  developments,  hence  an  investigation  of  how  established  political 
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institutions are playing-out in the development of financial markets in the continent could have 
important policy implications. 
Financial theory establishes that integrated and performing markets are relatively more 
efficient  compared  to  divergent  ones.  An integrated  and performing  stock market  stimulates 
cross-border flow of funds,  ameliorates  trading volume which in-turn increases stock market 
liquidity.  Developed  financial  markets  grant  investors  the  opportunity  to  efficiently  allocate 
capital(Chen et al.,2002; Asongu, 2012bcd). This results in a lower cost of capital for firms as 
well as lower transaction cost for investors(Kim et al.,2005). More so a performing financial 
market has the positive rewards to financial stability as it mitigates the probability of asymmetric 
shocks(Umutlu et al.,2010). Financial stability in-turn may curb the risk of cross-border financial 
contagion(Beine et al.,2010) and ameliorate the capacity of economies to absorb shocks(Yu et 
al., 2010).  
It is also worth stressing that stock markets may also be performing to reflect the level of 
arbitrage activity. When markets are well developed, it  implies there is a common force such as 
arbitrage  activity  that  binds the markets  together.  It  further  denotes  that  the development  of 
markets  will  mean  the  potential  for  making  above  normal  profits  and   international 
diversification will be restricted as super-normal profits are arbitraged away(Von Furstenberg & 
Jeon, 1989). In the same line of march, if walls or potential barriers generating country risks and 
exchange rate  premiums are absent,  the consequence is  similar  yields  for financial  assets  of 
similar risk and liquidity regardless of nationality and locality(Von Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989).
Thus, the need for African financial market development draws on the tenets of arbitrage and the 
hypothesis proffered by the portfolio theory. This implies, the motivations for growth in financial 
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markets  also  has  premises  in  the  literature  of  stock  market  interdependence  and   portfolio 
diversification(Grubel.,1968; Levy & Sarnat, 1970). 
2.3.2  Institutions, finance and African business 
But  for  a  few  exceptions(Osinubi  &  Amaghionveodiwe,2003)3,  historically  capital 
markets have played a significant role in financing the growth of African economies. Borrowing 
from  the  literature(Gray  &  Bythewood,  2001; Alagidede,2008;  Asongu,2012a),  African 
securities  markets  have  not  received  the  academic  attention  of  those  in  Latin  America  and 
Southeast Asia. As stressed by Gray & Bythehood(2001), African governments are focusing on 
the importance of moving toward more market-oriented economies and developing the financial 
market infrastructure to mobilize funds from both the private and public sectors. This motivation 
arises  from  issues  of  finance  in  small  and  medium-size  enterprises(SMEs)  in  developing 
countries  that  have  dominated  the  research  agenda  at  various  policy  levels(Quartey,2003; 
Biekpe,2004). 
Some papers have recommended regional cooperation as a possible way of alleviating the 
problem  resulting  from  small  financial  systems(Bossone  &  Honohan,  2003).  The  lack  of 
standardized rules and regulations(Clark,2003) have also incited  researcher  to assess African 
stock market  reforms.  Ngugi et  al.(2003) have investigated  how African stock markets  have 
responded to the reform process and identified three main types of reforms implemented in these 
markets  since  the  1990s,  namely:  modernization  of  trading  systems,  revitalization  of  the 
regulatory framework and relaxation of restrictions on foreign investors. A comparative analysis 
across sampled countries has demonstrated that markets with advanced trading technology, strict 
regulatory system and relaxed foreign investors’ participation show greater efficiency and lower 
3 This study empirically assessed the relationship between stock market development and long-run economic growth 
in Nigeria for the period 1980 to 2000 and no significant effect of  stock market development on the later was found. 
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market volatility. This stance on reforms has been acknowledged by Mutenheri & Green(2003) 
in a Zimbabwean context. They examined financial  reforms and financing decisions of listed 
firms in the country to find out that the difference between the pre-reform and post-reform era 
suggest  that  the  reforms  achieved  some  success  in  opening-up  the  capital  markets  and 
ameliorating the transparency of firm financing-behavior. 
Another category of issues in African business  focuses on how to improve Africa’s share 
of  Foreign  Direct  Investment(FDI).  Rolfe  &  Woodward(2004)  have  assessed  the  Zambian 
experience  of  attracting  FDI  through  privatization.  Findings  reveal  that  despite  increased 
foreign-investment during the 1990s, the economy has stagnated. They conclude that, having 
sold-off its state assets Zambia like other sub-Saharan African countries must endeavor to attract 
investment through other mechanisms. Bartels et al.(2009) examine the reason SSA’s FDI share 
has persistently averaged 1% of global flows. Inspired by the intuition that location decision and 
perceptions  of  investors  are  very  instructive  in  policy  making,  they  analyze  a  survey  of 
perceptions,  operations  and motivations  of 758 foreign investors in  10 SSA countries.  Their 
results  show  that,  the  provision  of  transaction  cost-reducing  information  on  industries  and 
markets on the one hand and utility services to investors on the other hand , before and after a 
firm’s FDI decision are important factors. Hence they conclude that FDI location decision in 
SSA is  strongly influenced  by political  economy considerations,  while  labor  and production 
input variables are not influential. As a broad extension of this analysis, using micro-data and 
firm interviews to explore the role of FDI drivers in South Africa, Toumi(2011) uses a micro 
level of analysis which enables specification of the investment climate constraints and concludes 
that  political  and  regulatory  uncertainty,  skills,  labor  regulation  and  exchange  volatility  are 
decisive factors. Kolstad & Wiig (2011) investigating Chinese FDI in Africa have established 
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that  these(FDIs) are resources-driven and posited: exploiting resources and weak institutions 
appears  to  be the name of  the investment  game in Africa.   Most  recently Darley(2012)  has 
presented public policy strategies, challenges and implications on the issue of increasing SSA’s 
share  of  FDI.   The  author  describes  anecdotal  predictors  of  FDI  inflows  that  include  key 
indicators  of  development,  governance  variables,  information  infrastructure  and  business 
environment.  Among  the  suggested  strategies  and  implications  are:  establishing  carefully 
monitored export processing zones,  looking outside the traditional inflows of FDI to Africa, 
expanding regional trading arrangements, working together to change the negative perception of 
the region and reducing corruption. 
2.3.3  Scope and positioning of the paper
Based  on  available  weight  of  business  challenges  and  suggestions  in  the  African 
continent,  there  are  crucial  needs  for  capital  inflows,  regulatory  reforms  and  institutional 
quality : having sold a great chunk of its state assets Zambia like other sub-Saharan African 
countries  must  endeavor  to  attract  investment  through  other  mechanisms(Rolfe  & 
Woodward,2004);  FDI  location  decision  in  SSA  is  influenced  by  strong  political  economy 
considerations (Bartels et al.,2009); political & regulatory uncertainty(Toumi,2011) and reducing 
corruption (Darley,2012) are crucial for FDI. Maybe one of the most exhaustive empirical study 
known  to  African  business  that  underlines  the  need  for  sound  political  institutions  is  by 
Goldsmith(2003). In a survey of business and government leaders on perceptions of governance 
in  Africa,  the  paper  reviews  800  business  leaders  in  Ghana,  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Malawi, 
Senegal,  Tanzania,  Uganda and Zambia.  Like most  African countries,  these 8 countries  had 
undertaken governance reforms over the past decade. Therefore the survey aimed to learn how 
business and government leaders perceive those recent governance reforms. A great chunk of 
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respondents  saw  major  problems  with  governance  and  political  institutions,  though  across 
countries they reported an impression of improvement and expected further gains. The results 
presented grounds for wary optimism about business-government relations in the region. Owing 
to the need for finance in the African continent, the imperative of  looking for other sources of 
investment  beside  FDI  and  the  established  role  of  stock  market  development  in  economic 
growth;   it  is  worthwhile  assessing  the  role  of  political  institutions  on   stock  market 
development.  Many  African  countries  especially  those  of  French  speaking  sub-Sahara  have 
financial markets that are taking too long to pick-up. Thus findings could lead to some crucial 
policy implications.    
 
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We  examine  a  panel  of  14  African  countries  with  data  from  African  Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) ranging from 1990 to 2010. Corresponding variables 
and countries are presented in the appendices (Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively). In line 
with  Yang  (2011),  dependent  variables  are  stock  market  capitalization,  stock  market  value 
traded, stock market turnover, and number of listed companies. Political institutions variables 
include,  democracy,  polity  and  autocracy.  Instrumental  variables  are:  legal-origins,  press-
freedoms,  income-levels  and  religious-dominations.  These  instruments  have  been  largely 
documented in the economic development literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Stulz & Williamson, 
2003; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011). Moreover Gray & Bythewood(2001) have concluded that 
historical  and  cultural  factors  play  a  significant  role  in  the  characteristics  of  African  stock 
markets. The instrumental variables are dummy (see summary statistics in Appendix 1) and the 
presence of perfect negative correlations  (between: French and English; Islam and Christian; 
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Low-income and Middle-Income countries) means the relationship that appears to exist between 
the two variables is negative 100% of the time(see  correlation analysis  in Appendix 2). For 
instance, no English country is French at the same time and vice versa. This interpretation is also 
valid for religious-domination and income-level dummies.
Summary statistics and correlation analysis are tabled in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
respectively. Whereas the former indicates that the distributions of the variables are comparable, 
the  later  guides  the  empirical  analysis  in  avoiding  issues  related  to  multicolinearity  and 
overparametization.  Only  14  African  countries  are  included  instead  of  the  whole  continent 
because only these countries have well functioning stock-markets will exploitable data. 
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity 
While  political  institutions  affect  stock  market  performance,  activities  of  financial 
markets also have a bearing on political institutions. Albeit some scholars take a restrained view, 
others  argue that  financial  globalization  generates  a  “golden straightjacket”  for  governments 
(Friedman, 1999). At the extreme, financial markets become masters of governments(political 
powers),  eviscerating the authority of national  states (Helleiner,  1994; Strange,  1996; Cerny, 
1999). Investors’ capacity for quit and the political voice it confers is crucial to these accounts. 
While financial market openness provides political institutions with greater access to capital, it 
also  subjects  them  to  external  market  discipline  (Obstfeld  &  Taylor,  2004).  Political 
establishments must sell their policies not only to voters but also to foreign investors. Based on 
the fact that investors can respond swiftly and severely to actual or expected outcomes, political  
institutions must consider financial participants’ preferences when choosing policies. The logic 
follows that financial openness should mitigate the capacity of governments to tax and spend or 
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more generally pursue divergent policies.  Thus this evidence of reverse-causality presents an 
important  issue  of  endogeneity  that  should  be  accounted  for  in  the  estimation  technique. 
Moreover, political institution indicators are perception-based measures which further confirm 
the endogeneity issue due to  biased perceptions  and omitted  variables.  Apart  from the most 
important source of endogeneity which is reverse-causality as described above, it  can also arise 
from  measurement  error,  autoregression  with  autocorrelated  errors,  simultaneity,  omitted 
variables and sample selection errors.
2.2.2 Estimation Technique
Borrowing from Beck et al.(2003) and recent African finance literature(Asongu, 2011bc) 
the paper adopts an Instrumental Variable(IV) estimation technique. IV estimates address the 
puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoid the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) when the explaining variables are correlated with the error term in the main 
equation. Borrowing from Asongu (2011bc), the Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) estimation 
method adopted by this paper will entail the following steps.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegalorigihannelPoliticalC )(10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ                        
                               itompressfreed )(4γ+ υα ++ itiX                                                                  (1) 
Second-stage regression:
++= itit DemocracyFinance )(10 γγ +itAutocracy)(2γ +itiXβ   µ                                      (2) 
In both equations, X is a set of explaining control variables. For Eq.(1) and Eq.(2),  v  and 
u, respectively  represent  the  disturbance  terms.  Instrumental  variables  include  legal-origins, 
dominant-religions, press-freedoms and income-levels. In Eq.(1), ‘ hannelPoliticalC ’ denotes: 
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democracy,  polity  and  autocracy.  ‘ Finance ’  in  Eq.(2)  represents  stock  market  performance 
dynamics of: stock market capitalization, stock market value traded, stock market turnover ratio 
and number of listed companies. 
We adopt the following steps in the analysis: 
-justify  the  use  of  a  TSLS  over  an  OLS  estimation  technique  with  the  Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
-demonstrate,  the  instruments  are  exogenous  to  the  endogenous  components  of  explaining 
variables (political institutions), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
-verify the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the equation of interest  
through an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. 
3.2.3 Robustness checks  
To ensure robustness of the analysis, the following checks will be carried out: (1) usage 
of alternative indicators of political institutions; (2) employment of two distinct interchangeable 
sets  of  moment  conditions  that  engender  every  category  of  the  instruments;  (3)  usage  of 
alternative indicators of stock market performance; (4) account for the concern of endogeneity; 
(5) usage of Principal  Component  Analysis(PCA) to reduce  the dimensions  of stock market 
dynamics  and  political  indicators  and  then  check  for  further  robustness  of  findings  in  the 
regressions of resulting indexes.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section addresses the ability of the exogenous components of political institutions to 
account for differences in stock market performance; the ability of the instruments to explain 
variations  in  the  endogenous  components  of  political  institutions  and  the  possibility  of  the 
24
instruments to account for stock market performance beyond political institution channels. To 
make  these  assessments,  we  use  the  TSLS-IV  estimation  method  with  legal-origins,  press-
freedoms, income-levels and religious-dominations as instrumental variables.
4.1 Political regimes and instruments 
In Table 1 below, we regress political-regime indicators on the instruments and test for 
their joint significance. This is the first-stage (requirement) of the IV estimation technique in 
which  the  endogenous  components  of  the  independent  variables  must  be  explained  by  the 
instruments, contingent on other covariates (control variables).  From the results of the Fisher-
statistics,  it  could  be  established  that  the  instruments  are  strong,  as  in  presence  of  control  
variables they enter jointly significantly into all regressions at the 1% significance level. Thus, 
‘instrumenting’  political  regimes  with  legal-origins,  religious-dominations,  income-levels  and 
press-freedom qualities help account for cross-country differences in the quality and nature of 
political institutions. We carry-out two separate regressions for each political-regime: one with 
the first set of instruments and the other with the second set. The results premised on both sets of 
instruments are alike. Based on the findings the following could be established. (1) Consistent 
with  the  law-finance(growth)  literature  (La  Portal  et  al.,1997,1998;  Beck  et  al.,2003; 
Agbor,2011), English common-law countries have higher levels of democracy than their French 
civil-law counterparts.  (2)  Democratic  institutions  improve with press-freedoms ;  contrary to 
Vaidya (2005)   and Oscarsson (2008).  
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Table 1: Political-regime channels and instruments (First-Stage regressions)
Democracy Polity Autocracy  
Constant 0.948 6.374*** 21.016*** 0.359 -20.311*** 6.374***
(0.456) (5.970) (8.080) (0.345) (-8.830) (5.970)
Legal-
origins
English  common-law 4.193*** --- -8.805*** --- 13.004*** ---
(4.417) (-7.411) (12.38)
French civil-law --- -12.597*** --- 7.594*** --- -12.597***
(-12.37) (7.641) (-12.37)
Religions
Christianity -1.062 --- -9.909*** --- 9.035*** ---
(-0.900) (-6.706) (6.914)




Low Income --- -5.537*** --- 6.152*** --- -5.537***
(-6.041) (6.874) (-6.041)
Middle Income -0.479 --- -0.257 --- -0.236 ---
(-0.657) (-0.282) (-0.293)
Lower Middle  Income -2.935*** --- -10.057*** --- 7.175*** ---
(-2.868) (-7.848) (6.332)




Free 4.113*** --- 5.375*** --- -1.193 ---
(5.032) (5.253) (-1.318)
Partly Free 2.818*** --- 3.695*** --- -0.780 ---
(3.870) (4.055) (-0.969)




Regulation  Quality  1.601*** --- 2.384*** --- -0.804* ---
(3.721) (4.425) (-1.688)
Voice and Accountability --- -1.914*** --- 5.716*** --- -1.914***
(-2.867) (8.767) (-2.867)
Adjusted R² 0.796 0.637 0.808 0.864 0.617 0.637
Fisher test 61.842*** 32.957*** 66.576**** 116.951*** 26.107*** 32.957***
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. 
4.2 Financial market and democracy 
This  section  seeks  to  address  two  main  issues:  (1)  the  ability  of  the  exogenous 
components of political institutions to explain stock market performance and; (2) the ability of 
the instruments to explain stock market performance beyond political regimes channels. To make 
these assessments, we employ the second-stage of the TSLS approach.
In the second-stage regressions, we first justify our choice of the IV estimation technique 
with the Hausman test for endogeneity. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is the position 
that the estimates by OLS are efficient and consistent. Thus a rejection of the null hypothesis 
points to the concern of inconsistent estimates as a result of endogeneity and hence lends credit 
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to the choice of our estimation technique. In cases where the null hypothesis of the Hausman test 
is  not  rejected(first  four  columns),  regressions  by  OLS are  provided.  We also  examine  the 
validity  and  strength  of  the  instruments  with  the  Sargan-OIR  and  Craig-Donald  tests 
respectively. The null hypothesis of the OIR test is the stance that the instruments explain stock 
market  performance  only  through  political  regime  channels.  Thus  a  rejection  of  the  null 
hypothesis  is  a  rejection  of  the  view  that  the  instruments  do  not  explain  stock  market 
performance beyond political regime channels. The Craig-Donald test is for the strength of the 
instruments at first-stage regressions. Its null hypothesis is the position that the instruments are 
weak.  Hence  its  rejection  confirms  the  strength  of  the  instruments.  While  the  first  issue  is 
addressed by the significance of estimated coefficients, the second issue depends on the outcome 
of the OIR test.
With  regard  to  the  first  concern,  overwhelming  significance  of  political-regime 
elasticities of stock market performance dynamics indicate that: democracy and polity positively 
affect stock market development, while autocracy(but for ‘listed companies’) mitigates it. The 
signs and significance of these elasticities are robust to the ‘stock market index’ regressions in 
the last column. As concerns the second issue which is addressed by the Sargan-OIR test, only 
the instruments pertaining to ‘stock market turnover’ and ‘stock market index’ regressions are 
valid, since their null hypotheses are not rejected. Hence we conclude that, while the instruments 
explain  the  ‘number  of  listed  companies’  through  some  other  mechanisms  beyond  political 
regime channels,  they(instruments) do not explain ‘stock market turnover’ and ‘stock market 
index’ beyond political regime channels. For all regressions that passed the Hausman test(last 
five columns),the instruments are strong based on the Craig-Donald test since the critical values 
for  TSLS  bias  relative  to  OLS  are  15.72  and  9.48  for  5%  and  10%   significance  levels 
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respectively. Overall, we find evidence that contrary to Mulligan et al.(2004), democracies have 
important effects on both the degree of competition for public office and the quality of public 
policies that favor stock market development in developing countries. 
Table 2: Second-Stage regressions
Stock Market(SM) Performance Robustness
SM Capitalization SM Value Traded SM Turnover Listed Companies SM Index
Constant 0.312*** 0.294*** 0.045* 0.041 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.022* 0.023* -0.277*
(6.594) (6.103) (1.825) (1.610) (3.192) (3.242) (1.876) (1.939) (-1.655)
Democracy 0.0308*** --- 0.013*** --- 0.008*** --- 0.012*** --- ---
(4.169) (3.547) (3.991) (6.722)
Polity 2(Revised) --- 0.034*** --- 0.014*** --- 0.008*** --- 0.012*** ---
(4.518) (3.604) (3.982) (6.702)
Democracy Index --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.580***
(4.722)
Autocracy -0.019** 0.016 -0.003 0.011 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.010*** -0.001
(-2.333) (1.302) (-0.866) (1.638) (-1.352) (0.987) (-0.842) (2.803) (-0.021)
Hausman-test 4.190 4.240 2.496 2.524 7.473** 7.552** 6.545** 6.721** 5.593*
OIR-Sargan --- --- --- --- 2.196 2.249 32.909*** 32.93*** 6.467
P-value [0.699] [0.690] [0.000] [0.000] [0.166]
Cragg-Donald --- --- --- --- 21.144** 20.992** 23.167** 22.982** 20.605**
Adjusted R² 0.098 0.108 0.053 0.054 0.085 0.084 0.241 0.087 0.134
Fisher Statistics 15.163*** 16.750*** 7.846*** 8.052*** 11.516*** 11.478*** 27.529*** 27.380*** 15.096***
Observations 259 259 245 245 158 158 163 163 154
Initial Instruments Constant; Lower-Middle-Income; Middle-Income; English; Christians; Free Press; Partly Free Press
Robust Instruments Constant; Upper-Middle-Income; Low-Income; French; Islam; Not Free Press
OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test for First-Stage regressions. Critical values for TSLS bias relative to OLS for  
Cragg-Donald Statistics  are 15.72 and 9.48 for  5% and 10% respectively.  *,**,***:  significance  levels  of  10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.  The 
democracy index is the first principal component of democracy and polity, while the stock market index is the first principal component of all stock  
market performance dynamics. 
4. 2 Discussion and policy implications 
Before delving into discussion of the findings, it is imperative to highlight the intuition 
and facts motivating this paper. There’s a dire need for alternative means of financing in the 
African continent, owing to failed privatization initiatives in most African countries. Economic 
instability  and  political  strife  have  plagued  many  African  countries  and  continue  to  pose  a 
significant threat to foreign investments(Kenyan post election crises in 2007/2008, Zimbabwe’s 
economic meltdown, Nigeria’s marred transition in 2008, the unending Egyptian revolution, not 
to mention recent coups d’état in Mali and Guinea-Bissau). The available weight of empirical 
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evidence as we have noticed in the literature points to the need for sound political and legal 
institutions in promoting stock market development. 
In the study we have found robust evidence that democratic institutions are relevant in 
the development of stock markets in Africa. Thus this positive democracy-financial development 
nexus  may  partly  elucidate  the  reason  many  African  countries  especially  those  of  French 
speaking  decent,  have  financial  markets  that  are  taking  too  long  to  pick-up.  The  relative 
importance of democratic institutions in English common-law countries in comparison with their 
French civil-law counterparts confirm why stock markets of some French speaking countries of 
SSA  (like the Douala Stock Exchange of Cameroon) have not improved much in operational 
activities since they were launched.
As  a  policy  recommendation,  the  role  of  sound  political  institutions  is  crucial  for 
financial  development  in  Africa.  Democracies  have  important  effects  on  both  the  degree  of 
competition  for  public  office  and  the  quality  of  public  offices  that  favor  stock  market 
development in the African continent. 
5. Conclusion
This  paper  has  assessed  the  incidence  of  political  institutions  on  stock  market 
performance  dynamics  in  Africa.  Channels  of  democracy,  polity  and  autocracy  have  been 
instrumented with legal-origins, religious-legacies, income-levels and press-freedom qualities to 
account for stock market  performance dynamics  of capitalization,  value traded, turnover and 
number of listed companies. Findings broadly demonstrate that democracy improves investigated 
stock market performance dynamics.  As a policy recommendation, the role of sound political 
institutions is crucial for financial development in Africa. Democracies have important effects on 
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both the degree of competition for public office and the quality of public offices that favor stock 
market development in the African continent.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics (1990 to 2010)




Stock Market  Capitalization 0.354 0.521 0.008 3.382 259
Stock Market  Value Traded  0.078 0.268 0.000 2.591 245
Stock Market Turnover 0.095 0.119 0.000 0.704 253
Number of Listed Companies 0.067 0.085 0.002 0.712 268
Democracy Democracy Index 3.170 4.315 -8.000 10.000 294
Polity Index(Revised) 0.653 6.499 -10.000 10.000 294
Autocracy Autocracy Index 2.544 3.837 -8.000 10.000 294
Control 
Variables 
Regulation  Quality  -0.224 0.694 -2.394 0.905 168
Voice and Accountability -0.389 0.793 -1.805 1.047 168
Legal 
Origin
English Common-Law 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
French Civil-Law 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Religion Christianity 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Islam 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Income 
Levels
Low Income 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Middle Income 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Lower Middle Income 0.428 0.495 0.000 1.000 294
Upper Middle Income 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Freedom of 
the Press
Press Freedom 0.345 0.476 0.000 1.000 165
Partial Press Freedom 0.230 0.422 0.000 1.000 165
No Press Freedom 0.424 0.495 0.000 1.000 165
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser : Observations 
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            Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis    
Stock  Market   Performance Political-regimes Control Vbles Instrumental  Variables
SMC SMVT SMT ListC Demo Poli Auto R.Q V&A Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI Free PFree NFree
1.000 0.863 0.733 0.242 0.294 0.331 -0.21 0.220 0.310 0.109 -0.10 0.123 -0.12 -0.14 0.144 -0.23 0.399 0.391 -0.12 -0.27 SMC
1.000 0.795 0.084 0.240 0.228 -0.10 0.218 0.257 0.074 -0.07 0.065 -0.06 -0.13 0.130 -0.13 0.274 0.337 -0.13 -0.21 SMV
1.000 0.078 0.118 0.056 0.039 0.128 0.096 -0.18 0.180 -0.24 0.242 -0.17 0.176 0.048 0.117 0.340 -0.06 -0.27 SMT
1.000 0.442 0.405 -0.16 0.334 0.458 0.146 -0.14 0.156 -0.15 -0.30 0.308 -0.26 0.596 0.557 -0.18 -0.37 ListC
1.000 0.805 -0.25 0.526 0.840 0.535 -0.53 0.353 -0.35 0.031 -0.03 -0.63 0.667 0.679 0.051 -0.69 Demo
1.000 -0.77 0.429 0.836 0.496 -0.49 0.437 -0.43 0.032 -0.03 -0.68 0.718 0.667 0.060 -069 Poli
1.000 -0.08 -0.39 -0.23 0.232 -0.33 0.336 -0.03 0.032 0.434 -0.44 -0.30 -0.03 0.324 Auto
1.000 0.725 0.013 -0.01 0.066 -0.06 -0.39 0.399 -0.20 0.627 0.618 -0.02 -0.58 R.Q
1.000 0.471 -0.47 0.397 -0.39 -0.07 0.079 -0.67 0.821 0.805 -0.00 -0.78 V&A
1.000 -1.00 0.650 -0.65 0.400 -0.40 -0.73 0.400 0.229 0.173 -0.36 Eng.
1.000 -0.65 0.650 -0.40 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 -0.17 0.368 Frch.
1.000 -1.00 0.400 -0.40 -0.73 0.400 0.229 -0.37 0.100 Chris
1.000 -4.00 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 0.377 -0.10 Islam
1.000 -1.00 -0.54 -0.40 -0.36 0.095 0.268 LI
1.000 0.547 0.400 0.363 -0.09 -0.26 MI
1.000 -0.54 -0.44 0.020 0.410 LMI
1.000 0.775 -0.11 -0.64 UMI
1.000 -0.39 -0.62 Free
1.000 -0.46 PFree
1.000 NFree
SMC: Stock Market Capitalization. SMVT: Stock Market Value Traded. SMT: Stock Market Turnover. ListC: Listed Companies. Demo: Democracy. Poli: Polity. Auto: Autocracy. R.Q: Regulation  
Quality. V&A: Voice and Accountability. Eng: English Common-Law. Frch. French Civil-Law. Chris: Christianity. LI: Low Income Countries. MI: Middle-Income-Countries. LMI: Lower-Middle-
Income Countries. UMI: Upper-Middle-Income Countries. Free: Freedom of the Press. PFree: Partial Freedom of the Press. NFree: No Freedom of the Press. 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions(Measurement) Sources
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
SMC Stock Market Capitalization(% of GDP): Measured as the share price 





SMVT Stock Market Total Value Traded(% of GDP): Measured as total value of 





SMT Stock Market Turnover Ratio: Measured as total  value of shares  traded 
during a period divided by average market capitalization for that period. 
World 
Bank(FDSD)
Listed Companies ListC Number of Listed Companies Per Capita(% of Population) World 
Bank(FDSD)
Democracy  Demo
Institutionalized Democracy: Measured by the presence of institutions and 
procedures  through  which  citizens  can  express  preferences  about 









Institutionalized Autocracy: Measured by the absence of institutions and 
procedures  through  which  citizens  can  express  preferences  about 






R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 





V & A Voice  and  Accountability  (estimate):  Measures  the  extent  to  which  a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government and 
to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
World 
Bank(WDI)
Press Freedom Free Freedom House Index : Level media freedom Freedom 
House
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num
Law
English Common-Law Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
10
French Civil-Law Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 4
Religion 
Christianity Botswana, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
10
Islam Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia. 4
Income 
Levels
Low-Income Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 4
Middle-Income Botswana, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia. 
10
Lower-Middle-Income Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tunisia. 
8
Upper-Middle-Income  Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa. 4
Num: Number of cross sections(countries)
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